by Andreas Peglau

 

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No definitive solutions

The old Engels would certainly have agreed that Marx’s teachings should be critically revisited. In 1895, six months before his death, he recapitulated in a letter: „But Marx’s whole approach is not a doctrine, but a method. It does not provide ready-made dogmas, but points of reference for further investigation.“[1] Five years earlier, he had said that the „conception of history“ developed by him and Marx was „above all a guide to study“.[2] As early as 1886, he described it as a „great fundamental idea“ of materialist dialectics „that the world should not be understood as a complex of finished things, but as a complex of processes in which the seemingly stable things undergo no less than their mental images in our heads, the concepts, a continuous change of becoming and passing away.“ Therefore, „the demand for definitive solutions and eternal truths must cease once and for all; one must always be aware of the necessary limitations of all knowledge gained.“[3]
However, anyone who consistently applied this to the concept of Marxism quickly found themselves labelled a dissident in „real socialism“ and ran the risk of being persecuted or – under Stalin – murdered.

Why should anything be further developed that Lenin had defined in 1913 as follows: „Marx’s doctrine is all-powerful because it is true. It is self-contained and harmonious; it gives people a unified world view.“[4] 

So what supposedly hardly needed revision before 1990 was supposedly hardly worth considering after 1990. The slogan „Marx is dead“ was widely accepted.[5] No wonder that an adequate assessment of the psyche never established itself in the mainstream of Marxism.[6]

 

Neglected preliminary work

In 1893, ten years after Marx’s death, Engels pointed out something that

„is not regularly emphasised enough in the writings of Marx and myself […] . Namely, we have all initially placed the main emphasis on the derivation of political, legal and other ideological ideas and the actions mediated by these ideas from basic economic facts, and we have had to do so. In doing so, we have neglected the formal side over the substantive side: the way in which these ideas etc. come about.“[7]

However, this was at most a half-hearted admission of our own limitations. The term „ideas“ itself is a psychological one. The question of how these ideas come about is anything but „formal“ – and qualified answers to this question could be found in the mid-19th century.

Since the Renaissance, there had been increased scientific interest in the psyche. Names such as Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Baruch de Spinoza (1632–1677), John Locke (1632–1704) and Denis Diderot (1713–1784) stood for this.[8]
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827) and Friedrich Fröbel (1772–1852) had drawn attention to childhood, education, schooling and thus to the anchoring of mental structures in life history.[9]
This was explored in depth in literature by Karl Philip Moritz (1756–1793), among others, who founded the magazine Zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (On Empirical Psychology) in 1783 and created the genre of the psychological development novel with Anton Reiser. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) also followed in his footsteps.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) anticipated many insights into mass psychology in his essay „What is Enlightenment?“.[10] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) advocated a view of human nature that was similar in parts to that of Sigmund Freud.[11] From the beginning of the 19th century, entrepreneur Robert Owen (1771–1858) not only proved that there were alternatives to predatory capitalism, he also linked this to thorough considerations on lifestyle, education, partnership and, ultimately, communist ideas.[12]
Most of these men were known to Marx and Engels,[13] and they engaged more intensively with some of them – such as Kant,[14] Rousseau[15] and Owen.[16] Goethe’s Faust tragedy, which, at least in its first part, tells a distinctly individual biography, was one of Marx’s favourite books,[17] from which he liked to quote, including in Capital.

Perhaps inspired by Rousseau, Marx wrote in his Feuerbach Theses in 1845: „The materialist doctrine of the change of circumstances and of education forgets that circumstances have to be changed by man and that the educator has himself to be educated.“[18] Years later, Engels emphasised from the „teachings of the materialist enlighteners“ that „the character of man“ is, on the one hand, the product of „innate organisation and, on the other hand, the circumstances surrounding man during his lifetime, but especially during his period of development“.[19]
However, neither he nor Marx seemed interested in what constitutes „innate organisation“ or how characters develop during the „developmental period“ of childhood and youth. They believed they held a key that opened every door anyway.

 

The Book of Human Powers

In 1844, Marx noted in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts:

„One can see how the history of industry and the concrete existence of industry that has come into being is the open book of human powers, of human psychology as it is sensually present […]. A psychology for which this book, that is, the most sensually present, most accessible part of history, has been closed, cannot become a real, meaningful and genuine science.“[20]

Undoubtedly, the mental state of those involved in the production process had an effect on it, just as this process had a reciprocal effect on those involved. It was therefore justified to demand that psychology be given due attention.

But Marx would have been aware in 1844 that archaeologists assumed an extended phase of human development in which there was no question of „industry“.[21] From 1800 onwards, the idea of „a long period in human history“ had become increasingly acceptable,[22] and by 1836 the division into the Stone, Bronze and Iron Ages had become established. In this „prehistory“, other „essential forces“ may have manifested themselves. Human life has probably always encompassed more than production, at least relationships between men and women, adults and children, and relationships with nature that had nothing to do with work. Therefore, the book of human forces should be considered much thicker than Marx was willing to admit – and the relevance of „industry“ correspondingly lower.
After all, in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx considered human forces, psychology and the interactions between industry and the psyche worthy of even more explicit mention. That was about to change soon.

 

Character masks 

 Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, the first volume of which was published in 1867, is considered the central work of Marx and Engels‘ teachings.[23] Preliminary work on this is contained in the Economic Manuscripts. There, Marx postulated:

„In fact, the rule of the capitalists over the workers is only the rule of the independent […] conditions of labour […] over the workers themselves […] The functions performed by the capitalist are only the functions of capital performed with consciousness and will […]. The capitalist functions only as personified capital, capital as a person, just as the worker functions only as personified labour […]. The rule of the capitalist over the worker is therefore the rule of the thing over the human being, of dead labour over living labour, of the product over the producer […], the reversal of the subject into the object and vice versa.“[24]

Accordingly, the preface to Capital stated that the „figures of the capitalist and the landowner“ outlined by Marx were

„only insofar as they are the personification of economic categories, the bearers of certain class relations and interests. Less than anyone else, my standpoint, which regards the development of economic social formations as a natural historical process, can hold the individual responsible for conditions of which he remains the social creature, however much he may subjectively rise above them.“[25]

Marx clearly did not consider the individual scope for rising above circumstances significant enough to explore. Instead, all three volumes of Capital vary on the thesis that people act according to predetermined patterns in the capitalist production process, like machines, without alternatives, helplessly subject to things and circumstances – wage workers just as much as capitalists.
Marx repeatedly stated that the capitalist is „capital personified, endowed with will and consciousness,“[26] that his „actions and omissions are merely functions“ of capital,[27] that his „soul“ is the „soul of capital.“[28] Only „as capital“ does „the automaton in the capitalist possess consciousness and will.“[29] Under „penalty of ruin,“ competition forces him to „improve production,“[30] his „drive for enrichment“ is

„effect of the social mechanism, in which it is only a cogwheel. Furthermore, the development of capitalist production makes a continuous increase in the capital invested in an industrial enterprise a necessity, and competition imposes the immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production on each individual capitalist as external laws of compulsion. It forces him to continually expand his capital in order to preserve it“.[31]

One of the tasks of the entrepreneur as „personified capital“ is also to ensure „that the worker performs his work properly and with the appropriate degree of intensity“.[32]
The worker, in turn, is „although free, naturally dependent on the capitalist,“[33] firmly bound to capital,[34] belonging to it as „disposable human material“[35] even „before he sells himself to the capitalist.“ [36][37]„Forced to sell themselves voluntarily,“[38] workers are transformed into „accessories,“[39] into „automatic driving forces,“ mere machines „for the production of surplus value,“[40] into „instruments of production“[41] and „raw materials“ of exploitation,[42] becoming „living[s] appendage“ incorporated into a „dead mechanism“.[43] The worker does not use the means of production, but is used by them and by the „working conditions“.[44]

Because people behave „merely atomistically“, i.e. in isolation from one another, in the production process, the „form“ of the production relations is independent „of their control and their conscious individual actions“.[45] „Just as man is dominated in religion by the product of his own mind,“ so „in capitalist production he is dominated by the product of his own hands“.[46]

To illustrate the relationship between capitalists and wage labourers, Marx uses the term „economic character masks“ several times. These masks are also „personifications of economic conditions“, with capitalist „slave owners“ and proletarian „slaves“, buyers and sellers of goods – including the „commodity labour“ – facing each other as their bearers.[47] The term „character“ therefore does not indicate that Marx wanted to deal with the psyche or claimed to include the actions of specific individuals. „The capitalist“ acts in order not to go bankrupt, „the proletarian“ in order not to starve – and neither can do otherwise. This made it unnecessary to consider further motives or deviating actions. Since Marx perceived people in capitalism as „cogwheels“ and „accessories“ of a machine, it seemed appropriate to him to describe their actions in a mechanistic way.
But could, can people really not do otherwise? Is the „subjective“ scope so narrow that no significant influence can be exerted on socio-economic conditions?

 

*

 

Continue reading in Part 3: Individual scope, Friedrich Engels, Robert Owen

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Sources of the entire text (mostly in German).

German version of part 2.

 

Notes

[1] Marx/Engels 1968, p. 96.

[2] Marx/Engels 1967b, p. 436.

[3] Engels 1975a, p. 293.

[4] Lenin 1977, p. 3. However, Lenin did not treat Marxism as complete (Sandkühler 2021, p. 1494f.).

[5] From the end of 1989 onwards, this was also exploited for propaganda purposes in Norbert Blüm’s version („Marx is dead, Jesus lives!“).

[6] Neither the increased interest in „Freudomarxism“ in the „West“ after 1968 or demands to take greater account of the „subjective factor“ (e.g. Parin 1986) or critical theory, nor did the attempts to develop a Marxist theory of the subject in the „East“ (e.g. Erpenbeck 1986; Borbely and Erpenbeck 1987). Such considerations certainly did not become part of state ideologies or the programmes of parties classifying themselves as „left-wing“. On the connections between Marxism and psychoanalysis, see also Gente 1972.

[7] Marx/Engels 1968, p. 96. In 1890, he had explained in another letter: „The fact that the younger generation sometimes attaches more importance to the economic side than it deserves is partly our own fault, Marx’s and mine. We had to emphasise the main principle, which our opponents denied, and there was not always the time, place or opportunity to do justice to the other factors involved in the interaction“ (Marx/Engels 1967b, p. 465).

[8] Stubbe 2021, pp. 119–128.

[9] This also rendered obsolete the previously held notion that childhood was not a distinct phase of life and that children were merely „little adults“ (cf. Bönig 2012).

[10] Kant 2004.

[11] Freud 1914, p. 53.

[12] Schultz 1948. Elsässer (1984, p. 237) attests that Owen and Fröbel „attribute great importance to the first years of life for later life […]. Both educators have insights into the psyche of the child that were only confirmed by science a hundred years later“.

[13] On Locke: Marx 2021, pp. 49f., 105, 116, 139, 165, 412, 645. On Diderot: ibid., p. 148; Kaiser/Werchan 1967, pp. 52, 80. On Schopenhauer: Marx/Engels 1975, p. 361; Ebeling/Lütkehaus 1985, pp. 193–195. Heinrich (2021, pp. 266f.) writes that Marx „held Spinoza in as high esteem as Hegel“. On the limits of Marx’s knowledge of philosophy: Anderson 2023, pp. 68f.

[14] Heinrich 2021, p. 195.

[15] Marx/Engels 2017, pp. 253, 459, 583, 584, 649; Kaiser/Werchan 1967, p. 175.

[16] See, for example, Engels 1973, pp. 197–200.

[17] Heinrich 2018, p. 13.

[18] Marx 1969, p. 5.

[19] Engels 1962a, p. 243.

[20] Marx 1968, p. 542.

[21] This was true even if Marx’s later, unusually broad definition of industry had been used as a basis: in Capital, published in 1867, he spoke of „rural patriarchal industry of a peasant family“ (Marx 2021, p. 92, cf. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrie).

[22] Stabrey 2017, p. 37.

[23] Engels played an important role in the creation and – from the second edition onwards – the structure of the first volume, and even more so in the content and form of the volumes published after Marx’s death (cf. Krätke 2020, pp. 24–44).

[24] Marx 2011, p. 64.

[25] Marx 2021, p. 16.

[26] Ibid., p. 168.

[27] Ibid., p. 619.

[28] Ibid., p. 247.

[29] Ibid., p. 425.

[30] Marx 1983a, p. 255.

[31] Marx 2021, p. 618.

[32] Ibid., p. 228.

[33] Ibid., p. 798, with the caveat that this applies to „old civilised countries.“

[34] Ibid., p. 675.

[35] Ibid., p. 662.

[36] Ibid., p. 603.

[37] Ibid., p. 381.

[38] Ibid., p. 793. A strange statement made by Marx on several occasions: Voluntariness is not compatible with coercion, not even „dialectically.“ This creates an emotional conflict in the people affected – which Marx ignores.

[39] Ibid., p. 508.

[40] Ibid., p. 421.

[41] Ibid., p. 396.

[42] Ibid., p. 350.

[43] Ibid., p. 445.

[44] Ibid., pp. 596, 446. The latter assertions are also difficult to reconcile with one another: does the worker become an instrument of production, or is he used by the means of production? Do the means of production use one another, and if so, all of them?

[45] Ibid., p. 108.

[46] Ibid., p. 649.

[47] Ibid., p. 100. A recent article on this subject states: „The question […] of what scope social roles (‚masks‘) open up for those who act within them […] is answered differently in Marxist-inspired social sciences. Marx tended to believe that it was only possible to rise above capitalist conditions to a very limited extent […]“. (Demirović n.d.). Hans Hiebel (2019, p. 41) confirms: „The individual behind the mask or role appears irrelevant.“ Wikipedia offers an astonishing thesis on „character masks.“ In a manner reminiscent of pathological personality splitting, people would switch between their „mask“ and their „‚true‘ self“ – a term that does not appear in Marx’s context of „character masks“ – in the blink of an eye. And they do so twice a day: „People in capitalism“ must act as capitalists or proletarians in the „production process […] and thus fulfil an objectively necessary function that has nothing to do with their otherwise ‚true‘ selves. In their everyday working lives, they slip into the masks of capitalists and workers, but after work, people can drop these masks.“ Following this thesis, Marx’s answer to the „fundamental question of philosophy“ would have to be supplemented: „It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness – but only between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m.“ Marx did not comment on what the „production self“ takes home with it.