by Andreas Peglau  

 

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Starting points

Today, as the US-led „West“ accepts the destruction of the entire planet in order to maintain its „rules-based“ hegemony, there is a greater need than ever to find alternatives to irresponsible greed for profit and power, warmongering and hostility towards life.

Socialism, which had been tried out in practice, at least to some extent, in several countries, was seen as such an alternative. Its most important theoretical starting point was the teachings of Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), which were often distorted in the context of ‚Marxism-Leninism‘. „Real socialism“ was massively discredited early on, particularly by state terror under Stalin and later under Mao Tse Tung and Pol Pot, and collapsed around 1990. Since then, such concepts have generally been considered permanently discredited, and capitalism has been regarded as without alternative.

Precisely because Marx and Engels sensibly did not even attempt to draft programmes for future societies, it is wrong to blame them for their failure. In any case, they bear no responsibility for state terror.
Anyone who does not yet know or does not want to know that systems based on capitalist exploitation are unjust and should therefore be „overthrown“, who wants to understand the important socio-economic dependencies and interrelationships underlying these systems, who is interested in the assumptions derived from them about past and future social orders, can still draw much of value from the legacy of Marx and Engels.

The relevance of their social criticism is documented by these demands alone, written for a leaflet in March 1848:[1]

• free „administration of justice“, i.e. an actual, not just for the wealthy,
• the conversion of all „princely and other feudal estates, all mines, etc. […] into state
  property“,
• a „state bank“ to replace „all private banks“, which would regulate the „credit systemin the interests of the whole people“ and „thus undermining the rule of the big financiers“,
• the nationalisation of all „means of transport: railways, canals, steamships, roads, Items etc. that should thus be „made available free of charge to the poor“
• equal „remuneration for all civil servants“ with the sole exception that „those with families, i.e. with greater needs, also receive a higher salary than the others“,
• „complete separation of church and state“,
• „restriction of inheritance rights“,
• „introduction of strong progressive taxes and abolition of consumption taxes“,
• „establishment of national workshops“, whereby the state „guarantees all workers
  their livelihood and providing for those unable to work.“

They emphasised that the state they had in mind was a truly democratic one, designed in the interests of the masses:

„It is in the interest of the German proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry to work with all their energy to implement the above measures. For only by implementing them can the millions who have hitherto been exploited in Germany by a small number and who will continue to be oppressed obtain their rights and the power that is due to them as the producers of all wealth.“[2]

But can we deduce from this objective, which is as justified as it is unfulfilled in the Federal Republic of Germany, that the teachings of Marx and Engels[3] contain conclusive assumptions about how their list of demands can be implemented, how exploitation and oppression can be ended – or even the intellectual tools to use our current national and global crisis for constructive change?[4]
No. For this doctrine is not only incomplete, limited in content and scope[5] and partly outdated. Above all, it suffers from a cardinal error that has never been corrected: the „economistic“ exclusion of the real psyche[6]  – and thus the exclusion of what is decisive about being human. It therefore offers no basis for adequately understanding, let alone solving, social problems that always extend beyond the economic sphere. I will demonstrate this in Part 1 of my text, which takes up most of the space.
It was not easy for me to allow this insight, which was so new to me in its sharpness, to take hold and to say goodbye to the illusions that still remained[7] . Sometimes the feelings this triggered were reflected in my tone of voice. It does not change the substance of my criticism.

Why do I think it is worthwhile to write down this criticism? Because it is important not to stare in a direction from which necessary solutions cannot come. And to encourage those who are looking for such solutions to consider other approaches.

In particular, the psychoanalysts and social scientists Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm went far beyond Marx and Engels decades ago in terms of integrating psychosocial circumstances. As I have long been involved in popularising Reich’s work, I will only occasionally refer to it here; detailed information can be found on my website.[8]

In the short second part of this text, I will outline my thoughts on four important aspects of Marx and Engels‘ teachings, taking into account the views that I consider relevant, as a stimulus for discussion.

What gives me the right to make these claims?

There were plenty of opportunities to read Marx and Engels in GDR schools. Marxism-Leninism („ML“) was part of every GDR course of study, including my training as a psychologist. But I never attempted to explore the complete works of the „socialist classics“; I often limited myself to excerpts, biographies, summaries and secondary literature. This raises the suspicion that what I am missing can be found elsewhere in the more than 40 volumes of the Marx-Engels Works edition.[9] However, as will become apparent, even though alternative ideas occasionally flashed through their minds, Marx and Engels had already settled on a general approach from 1845 onwards that left no room for an appropriate appreciation of psychological insights.[10]
This approach was essentially retained in the mainstream of Marxism.[11] Although I am not familiar with the entirety of Marxist literature, I am certain that psychological issues do not receive the attention they deserve.[12] Otherwise, Reich and Fromm – who, more profoundly than other Marxists, linked their ideas to valid insights from depth psychology[13] – would be frequently cited and highly regarded as inspirers of ‚left-wing‘ discussions. This is definitely not the case.[14]

One final preliminary remark. When my text refers to a desirable future, I will mostly speak of a „humane order“ rather than „socialism.“ The term socialism, like communism, is not clearly defined and has been and continues to be used in very different ways,[15] often misused, not least in „National Socialism.“ A humane order[16] strikes me as hitting the nail on the head. This is also likely to be in line with the 25-year-old Marx, who established the „categorical imperative“ to „overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, abandoned, despicable being“.[17] Some 130 years later, Erich Fromm concretised this in the image of a society „in which no one need feel threatened: not the child by its parents; not the parents by those above them; not one social class by another; not one nation by a superpower“.[18]
I still have no doubt whatsoever about our fundamental ability to build such a society. By nature, we are social, lovable, capable of love and in need of love, sociable, inquisitive and creative beings.[19] Every human being is born with the potential for a new beginning.

* 

PART 1:

People as puppets

  

Repression

Scientific psychology was still in its infancy in the mid-19th century.[20] However, since ancient times, a multitude of psychological insights and theories had been formulated, not least by philosophers. Moreover, the psyche is not something that one needs to learn about from specialist books: everyone has one, and we are constantly dealing with it. Anyone who judges people while ignoring psychological factors is denying their own experience of reality – or repressing it.

Something is repressed, „shifted“ into the unconscious, when it is perceived as so unsettling or threatening that it can no longer be tolerated in the conscious mind. However, since the repressed does not cease to exist as a result, but pushes its way back into consciousness, this shift must be constantly maintained and renewed. This happens unconsciously and is not controlled by the will.

I believe that Marx and Engels were only able to put forward a significant portion of their often seemingly irrefutable theses by adopting what was ultimately an anti-psychological stance. If they had incorporated a more realistic view of human nature, many things would have appeared far more complex and complicated, and various of their statements would have been revealed as absurd, at least in their absoluteness or generalisation. Dealing with the psyche would therefore have severely limited the far-reaching claims to validity and explanation asserted by Marx and Engels and invalidated a number of their core statements. At the same time, this would have threatened Marx and Engels: their self-image, their self-esteem, their idea of the significance of their life’s work. Understandable reasons for repression.

What I am outlining here is not a problem specific to Marx and Engels. Authoritarian-patriarchal family and social structures, in which they too grew up, inevitably cause psychic disturbances,[21] always affecting self-esteem. In order not to have to face up to this, one can try to compensate for ingrained feelings of inferiority with exaggerated notions of one’s own importance.

Marx and Engels began the collection of texts later known as The German Ideology in October 1845 with a sentence that was symptomatic in this regard, devaluing the millennia of reflection that had preceded them: „People have always had false ideas about themselves, about what they are or should be.“[22] But now, they said, 24-year-old Friedrich Engels and 27-year-old Karl Marx  had arrived and would finally explain to people who they were. But they did so only to a very limited extent.

 

„Max Stirner“

In addition to their desire to free themselves uncompromisingly from everything „idealistic,“ such self-esteem issues may have been the background for Marx and Engels‘ rigid distinctions from some philosophical precursors and contemporary competitors, especially Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806–1856).[23]
Schmidt had in common with Marx and Engels that in 1844 they could already look back on a comparatively extensive journalistic career, belonged to the followers of the philosopher Hegel, often referred to as „Young Hegelians“,[24] and had until recently harboured hopes for positive political change in Germany, especially in Prussia.

However, the accession of Frederick William IV to the throne in 1840 had brought about a restoration of ecclesiastical-feudal power instead of the longed-for greater freedom for social criticism, especially anti-religious criticism. Since the Young Hegelians regarded religion as the most important pillar of the state, they believed that this social criticism could bring about „a social upheaval comparable to the French Revolution“[25]: revolution through „enlightenment“. But not only had the new Prussian monarch disappointed the expectations placed in him.[26] Unlike in France in 1789, the liberal bourgeoisie, and ultimately the entire population, offered no significant resistance to the resurgent feudal regime. The decisive assumptions of the „Young Hegelians“ thus proved to be illusory. New sources of hope, new explanatory models and new paths to revolution had to be found.[27]

This led Marx and Engels to place their hopes in the emerging proletariat as the new, most exploited class and to interpret the „history of all previous society“ as the economically determined „history of class struggles“.[28] Gradually, they developed what Engels retrospectively called „historical materialism“ in 1892, namely a „conception of the course of world history that sees the ultimate cause and decisive driving force of all important historical events in the economic development of society“.[29]

Johann Caspar Schmidt came to a completely different conclusion. He chose the individual as his beacon of hope, who was prevented from developing their personality and satisfying their needs by authoritarian nuclear families and education, sexual repression and egalitarian ideologies such as Christianity.[30] Schmidt saw the way out in taking oneself as the only yardstick, forcing one’s own unique path against the restrictive society. Instead of „selflessly serving a leader, ruler, god or other ‚great egoists‘ from afar,“ he now wanted to „be the egoist himself“ – this is how Schmidt summarised his ideal in 1844 in the book Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and Its Own).[31]
To avoid the expected state reprisals for his rebellious text, he published it under the pseudonym „Max Stirner“. In fact, the work was banned shortly after its publication. [32]

Engels, who was friends with „Stirner“, initially responded to his writing with benevolent criticism. On 19 November 1844, he wrote to Marx:

„We must not discard it, but […] build on it by turning it around. […] First, it is a trifling matter to prove to St.[irner] that his egoistic people must necessarily become communists out of pure egoism. […] Secondly, he must be told that the human heart is, from the outset, immediately, in its egoism, unselfish and sacrificial […].“[33]

These „few trivialities“ should suffice to refute Stirner’s „one-sidedness. But what is true about the principle,“ Engels continues,

„we must also accept. And what is true about it is that we must first make a thing our own, selfish thing before we can do anything for it – that in this sense […] we are also communists out of egoism. […] We must start from the ego, from the empirical, embodied individual.“[34]

Starting from the self, the individual and a positive, (now proven[35]) realistic view of humanity, recognising psychological motives and internalised goals as the basis for commitment to social change, becoming a communist out of healthy egoism – what a constructive approach this could have been for a worldview,[36] that was truly worthy of the name!

But Marx had already set a course in which he wanted to classify Stirner only as an opponent. In addition, Stirner had now been the first to publish some ideas that were still maturing in Marx’s mind[37] – and he had been successful. Even Ludwig Feuerbach, at that time the undisputed number one in the discourse of the „Young Hegelians“, considered The Ego and Its Own worthy of a detailed public response.[38] This was tantamount to „promoting Stirner to the front row“ of the philosophers of the time,[39] making him the „big fish“ in Marx’s „self-proclaimed fishpond“.[40]
Marx seems to have responded rather harshly to Engels‘ letter. Engels relented,[41] submitted to Marx and was now to devalue himself in comparison with Marx for the rest of his life – unjustly so. [42]

In 1845/46, both undertook what[43] described as the „most intense individual debate“ they had „ever had with a thinker“.[44] For eight months, in almost 450 manuscript pages,[45] they endeavoured to refute Stirner. In doing so, they defamed him in a petty and spiteful manner, subjecting him, as Stirner biographer Bernd Laska writes, to a „barrage“ of insults and,[46] among other things , denigrating him as the „weakest and most ignorant“ of the „entire philosophical brotherhood,“[47] as „the most hollow and meagre skull among philosophers.“[48] In their polemic, intended for imminent publication, they also provided information that made it easier to uncover Stirner’s identity. They caricatured Stirner, who lived in the Berlin district of Neukölln, worked as a teacher and lived in precarious financial circumstances, as

„a localised Berlin schoolmaster or writer […], whose activity is limited to hard work on the one hand and the enjoyment of thought on the other, whose world extends from Moabit to Köpenick and is boarded up behind the Hamburg Thor, whose relations with this world are reduced to a minimum by a miserable position in life“.[49]

It is difficult to imagine that they did not realise that they were putting Stirner in danger at a time when unpopular publications could lead to imprisonment. In any case, only those who feel deeply offended react so aggressively.[50]

 

German Ideology

However, the planned publication of the debate with Stirner and – less in-depth and extensive – other thinkers fell through. Until the end of 1847, Marx and Engels made several unsuccessful attempts to publish these manuscripts,[51] which underlines the importance they attached to their text.

It was not until the 1920s, in the Soviet Union, that an attempt was made to publish the collection in book form. The attempt to make it relatively close to the original, contrary to Stalin’s ideas, cost David Ryazanov, who was responsible for it, „first his position as editor and finally his life“: in 1931, he was removed from his post and, after many years of exile, shot in 1938 as a „right-wing Trotskyist“.[52] In a falsified, incomplete version, the collection of texts was published in 1932 as Deutsche Ideologie (German Ideology). In accordance with the specifications, a work with a „canonical character“ had been constructed[53] , the supposed „founding text of historical materialism“,[54] which, according to the new editor, „illuminates its fundamental questions […] in a multifaceted and exhaustive manner“.[55]

With an identical assessment, only even more mutilated, The German Ideology appeared in 1958 in volume 3 of the Marx-Engels-Werke[56] . Both versions suggested that the text was primarily intended as a critique of Feuerbach, thus negating the immense significance that The Ego and Its Own had had.

This did not mean that Stirner was spared dogmatic Marxist criticism. This went so far as to accuse him of being „responsible for social democratic revisionism and thus for the powerlessness of the labour movement in the face of the First World War, for the failure of the November Revolution and for the failure of the labour movement in the face of fascism“.[57] The original version of The German Ideology, in which the full force of the attack against Stirner can be felt on well over half of the pages,[58] has only been available to read since 2017.[59]

In 1914, the „Austro-Marxist“ Max Adler classified Stirner’s social criticism as „the psychological counterpart to Marx’s sociological criticism“.[60] Stirner researcher Bernd Kast concludes: „While Marx and Engels and all socialists want to change material conditions, Stirner is concerned with changing the individual.“[61]

Stirner vehemently opposed any kind of psychological (de)formation and ideological manipulation. But Marx and Engels, who had also previously campaigned against indoctrination, especially religious indoctrination, now countered: ideology and the psyche have no independence whatsoever, they are not worth closer examination, and therefore even this examination is bourgeois-reactionary![62]

Psychology distracts from class struggle – this became a motto of Marxism-Leninism, supplemented in the GDR by „From I to We!“ Individuality, subjectivity, personal development, needs and sensitivities: there was no adequate engagement with anything that Stirner had focused on.

I suspect that Marx and Engels were already – unconsciously – disturbed by what Stirner suggested: an intense look at oneself, including inwardly.[63] Such a look can bring to light painful memories from one’s life history, self-doubt and fears, and therefore evokes psychological resistance and defence mechanisms. [64]

I don’t know how things could have been different for Marx and Engels. Psychotherapy, which could have helped them work through their issues, did not yet exist. So these issues also had an impact on their teachings, limiting their truthfulness as „blind spots“: we have to make an effort to look past what we don’t want to see.

 

* 

 

Continue reading in Part 2: Charakter masks.

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Sources of the entire text (mostly in German).

German version of part 1.

 

Notes:

[1] Marx/Engels 1959, p. 3f. The following quotations: ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 4f.

[3] Their teachings are not identical with what has become known as „Marxism,“ and even less so with „Marxism-Leninism.“ According to Engels, Marx was at least ambivalent about being labelled a „Marxist“ himself (Hoffmann 2018, p. 1f., cf. Krätke 1999, Fn1). After Engels‘ death, simplification and „vulgarisation“ set in (Heinrich 2021, pp. 23–26), followed later by a split into opposing, sometimes hostile „Marxisms“ (Adler 1972, pp. 5–11; Haug 1985, pp. 25–29; Harman 1986; Morina 2017; Kolias 2020; Baier 2023). The term „Marxism“ also has an authoritarian, unscientific connotation: instead of defining a body of ideas, it iconises a person. No one would think of renaming physics „Einsteinism.“ In 1877, Marx also emphasised his „aversion to all personality cults“ in a letter: His and Engels‘ entry into what later became the „Communist League“ in 1847 was „only on condition“ that „everything that was conducive to the superstition of authority“ be removed from the statutes (Marx/Engels 1966, p. 308).

[4] Marx left behind an unfinished work. Engels rounded off Marx’s work on a number of points, applied Marx’s and his own theses to other areas, popularised – some say watered down – their teachings, and is sometimes referred to as the „inventor“ of Marxism (Krader 1973, pp. 124–136; Krätke 2020, pp. 9–68; Hunt 2021; Rapic 2022).

[5] See, among others, Thompson 1980, p. 109; Anderson 2023, pp. 114–124.

[6] Statements that (also) touch on the psychological can be found – in Marx’s case, particularly in his „early writings“ – primarily in connection with „sensual“/“senses“, „spiritual“/“spirit“ or „conscious“/“consciousness“. Sometimes „spiritual“/“soul“ is used, very rarely „psychological“/“psyche“ or „psychology“ – the latter appears four times in The German Ideology (Marx/Engels 2017), but not at all     in the three volumes of Capital. Often, the focus is not on people, but on things, circumstances, conditions, philosophical concepts. The fact that Marx and Engels rarely addressed mental processes explicitly is evidenced by the desperate attempts to later attribute to them a kind of guiding authority for „socialist psychology“. Scattered sentences were then usually upgraded as evidence of an „internally consistent system of ideas […], a closed whole“ with which Marx had mapped out „paths for the construction of psychology“ (Rubinstein 1981, p. 11).

[7] I describe the beginning of this process of separation in Peglau 2001.

[8] https://andreas-peglau-psychoanalyse.de/ On Reich: https://andreas-peglau-psychoanalyse.de/tag/reich/. Detailed information on Fromm: https://fromm-gesellschaft.eu/.

[9] See: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx-Engels-Werke. On MEGA: https://mega.bbaw.de/de.

[10] Fromm (1989a, pp. 335–432) assessed this more positively, primarily on the basis of Marx’s „early writings“. I agree with him insofar as Marx, until 1844, partly advocated theses that would have made a more holistic theory possible (see also Lange 1955, pp. 30–33) and that were also stimulating for psychology.

[11] The proponents of „real socialism“ (e.g. Kosing 1970; Bitschko 1970) largely ignored or opposed „Western Marxism,“ which included Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, Jean Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser – whom Thompson (1980) classifies as Stalinists – and the „Frankfurt School.“ Anderson (2023, pp. 58–100) is critical of these „Western“ variants of Marxism, among other things because, lacking revolutionary practice, they tended towards abstract theory and language and a pessimistic view of humanity and society, often falling back from wanting to change the world to merely interpreting it, and in Horkheimer’s case ultimately even to an „unspeakable apology for capitalism“. Dahmer (2022, p. 9) counts Leon Trotsky among „Western Marxism,“ while Anderson (2023, p. 102) sees him as positively distinct from it. Both acknowledge Trotsky’s outstanding importance for the further development of Marxism; Dahmer (2022, pp. 33–75) also because of Trotsky’s – not very profound – interest in psychoanalysis.

[12] This is confirmed by Gehrke (2011), among others. This polemic on the programme of the left, published under the motto „To overturn all conditions …“, is far from even naming „all“ conditions, let alone discussing how they can be researched and overturned. In her book Reichtum ohne Gier (Wealth without Greed, 2016), Sahra Wagenknecht does mention the psyche in the title, but only briefly addresses the topic of images of humanity at the beginning – only to return to the economy for the rest of the book. In Michael Brie’s (2021) attempt to rediscover socialism, the psyche, education, childhood, sexuality and the image of humanity play virtually no role, except for a nine-line reference to the psychiatrist and neuroimmunologist Joachim Bauer (ibid., p. 122).

[13] Depth psychology was also incorporated by the Frankfurt School. However, its validity suffers considerably, particularly in the case of its most well-known representatives (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse), due to the fact that they adopted the late Freud’s pessimistic view of human nature, which was partly detached from reality and included the „death drive“ (see Peglau 2018b). Moreover, how could the „association of free people“ hoped for by Marx be formed with beings who are antisocial, destructive and murderous from birth? Instead of freedom, constant control, oppression or „brainwashing“ would be inevitable. On how Adorno adopted key insights from Fromm and Reich in The Authoritarian Personality without naming their authorship, see Peglau 2018a, p. 99f.

[14] Haug (1985), Harman (1986), Morina (2017) and Anderson (2023) mention either Reich or Fromm, although Anderson discusses in detail the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, to which Fromm belonged until 1939 and where Reich courageously implemented the combination of theory and practice desired by Anderson until the mid-1930s (Peglau 2017a, pp. 88–145, 311–345). The afterword to Anderson’s work, first published in German in 1978 and supplemented in 2023, does not fill this gap. Baier (2023, pp. 231–235) does at least acknowledge Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism (Reich 2020) and Fromm’s study Workers and Employees on the Eve of the Third Reich (Fromm 1989b). He also fails to recognise how fundamentally Reich and Fromm could have challenged and enriched Marxism.

[15] See Mittelstraß 2004, vol. 3, pp. 857–859. The distinction between the terms „socialism“ and „communism“ (ibid., pp. 425f.) is also vague. Marx and Engels initially used both terms synonymously (Hunt 2021, pp. 91f.), but soon began to distinguish between them more clearly, later attaching less importance to this distinction (cf. Engels 1977b, pp. 580f.).

[16] This also needs to be defined more precisely, but it can be used more effectively as a starting point for verifiable social science questions.

[17] Marx 1976a, p. 385.

[18] Fromm 1989c, p. 395.

[19] Peglau 2023; 2024b.

[20] Mittelstraß 2004, vol. 3, p. 396.

[21] Little is known about Marx’s childhood. His father seems to have been relatively tolerant, but put him under pressure to succeed and delegated his own goals to him: „I wish to see in you what I might have become if I had been born under equally favourable auspices [omens]. You can fulfil or destroy my fondest hopes“ (Heinrich 2018, p. 125f.). The fact that his mother wrote to 17-year-old Karl demanding that he scrub himself „weekly with a sponge [sic] and soap“ (ibid., p. 143) sounds like overprotective nagging. This may have created a mixture of excessive ambition and feelings of inferiority that Marx struggled with throughout his life. It cannot be ruled out that the bourgeois families of Marx and Engels were non-authoritarian islands in the authoritarian Prussian state. Engels‘ father complained that 15-year-old Friedrich, „despite earlier severe punishments […] did not learn unconditional obedience, even out of fear of punishment“. Engels later distanced himself from the „fanatical and despotic old man“ (Hunt 2021, p. 29).

[22] Marx/Engels 2017, p. 3.

[23] Pagel 2020, p. 24.

[24] On this classification and why it is only of limited help: Heinrich 2018, pp. 302–308.

[25] Pagel 2020, p. 25.

[26] Ibid., pp. 50f.

[27] For details, see ibid., in particular pp. 42–302.

[28] Marx/Engels 1959, p. 462.

[29] Engels 1972, p. 298.

[30] In doing so, he anticipated some of the ideas that were pointedly advocated in the 20th century by Wilhelm Reich (2018; 2020), among others.

[31] Stirner 2016, quotation p. 14f. On Stirner, see also Eßbach 1982; Korfmacher 2001; Pagel 2020; Laska 2024.

[32] Ibid. pp. 20–24.

[33] Marx/Engels 1975, p. 252.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Hüther 2003; Solms/Turnbull 2004, pp. 138ff., 148; Tomasello 2010; Klein 2011; Bauer 2011; Bregman 2020.

[36] In 1886, Engels (1975a, pp. 263f.) explicitly used this term for the doctrine established by Marx and himself.

[37] On the similarities with Stirner that Marx and Engels did not acknowledge: Eßbach 1982, in particular pp. 38–62.

[38] Although Feuerbach wrote anonymously, his authorship was „no secret“ to insiders such as Marx and Engels (Pagel 2020, p. 452). In 1846, Feuerbach included an expanded version of his contribution in his Complete Works (Laska 2024, p. 5). Privately, he judged Stirner’s book to be a „highly witty and ingenious work“; Stirner was „the most ingenious and freest writer I have ever known“ (ibid.).

[39] Pagel 2020, p. 452.

[40] Korfmacher (2001, p. 64) includes Engels in the „fishpond“ metaphor. In my opinion, Engels‘ reaction to Stirner in particular shows that Engels did not (yet) have this claim in 1844. Pagel (2020) describes in detail the „struggle for supremacy in determining consciousness,“ in which Marx and Engels expanded „their repertoire for disavowing competing approaches“ in order to assert their own „hegemonic variant“ (ibid., pp. 30, 39).

[41] Ibid., pp. 413–415; Marx/Engels 1975, p. 259.

[42] See Krätke 2020, pp. 9–12.

[43] Engels was clearly much less involved than Marx (Marx/Engels 2017, pp. 749f.).

[44] Peter Sloterdijk, quoted in Pagel 2020, p. 492.

[45] Ibid., p. 472. This critique of Stirner’s book was thus more extensive than the book itself.

[46] Laska 2024, pp. 83–92.

[47] Marx/Engels 2017, p. 237.

[48] Ibid., p. 506. However, it was not uncommon for Marx to disparage those who did not share his views. He could be „hurtfully, unbearably arrogant“: „Anyone who was not for him was against him“ (Schieder 2018, p. 170f.).

[49] Marx/Engels 2017, p. 319f. They refer to Stirner as a „schoolmaster“ or „Berlin schoolmaster“ several times in this work.

[50] The fact that Stirner also entered the field of „national economics“ in 1845, which Marx now favoured (Pagel 2020, p. 429f.), may have intensified this concern.

[51] Weckwerth 2018, p. 146.

[52] Pagel 2020, p. 1, 8 and https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawid_Borissowitsch_Rjasanow.

[53] Marx/Engels 2017, p. 790.

[54] Pagel 2020, p. 1. Engels (1975a, p. 264), on the other hand, recapitulated self-critically in 1888 on the „old manuscript of 1845/46“: „The section on Feuerbach is incomplete. The finished part consists of an exposition of the materialist conception of history, which only proves how incomplete our knowledge of economic history was at that time.“ He omitted Stirner’s significance and never corrected this (Laska 2024, pp. 91–92).

[55] Marx/Engels 2017, p. 791. Although it could not be described as „exhaustive,“ it was the first time that „the enormous reductionism of subjective behavioural dimensions“ was formulated „against Stirner,“ the first time that „any criticism of political power not based on the relations of production was rejected in a coherent form,“ and the first time that the historical-materialist model of an economically determined sequence of social forms was developed (Eßbach, 1982, p. 13). Pagel (2020, pp. 603–653) demonstrates that „in particular, the development“ of the concepts of „ideology“ and „petty bourgeoisie“ in Marx and Engels can be traced back to „the debate with Stirner“ (ibid., p. 19).

[56] Marx/Engels 1978. Accordingly, Kosing (1970, p. 1154) describes The German Ideology as a „coherent and comprehensive presentation of their new worldview“.

[57] This is how Eßbach (1982, p. 13) summarises the argumentation of Hans G. Helms (1966).

[58] The text on Stirner takes up approximately 450 pages in this edition (Marx/Engels 2017, pp. 16–123; 165–511), „is not only by far the most extensive of the manuscripts on German Ideology, it is also the manuscript that Marx and Engels completed first for printing in the planned quarterly journal in April 1846″ (Pagel 2018, p. 134). Publishing this therefore seemed to them to be the most urgent task.

[59] On the history of the edition: Marx/Engels 2017, pp. 784–793; Pagel 2020, pp. 3–11, Weckwerth 2018.

[60] Quoted in Eßbach 1982, p. 25.

[61] Stirner 2016, p. 373.

[62] Eßbach (1982, pp. 72–79) suggests that Marx and Engels wanted to „outdo“ Stirner in their criticism.

[63] Indeed, some of Stirner’s ideas – e.g. about the internalisation of oppressive norms – seem „like an anticipation of Freud’s psychoanalysis“ (ibid., p. 70, see also Max Stirner Archive 2001). Engels does not seem to have contested these implications of Stirner’s work, at least initially. However, by agreeing with Marx’s blanket dismissal of Stirner, he too avoided the potentially unsettling confrontation with the psychological level of Stirner’s book.

[64] Laska (2024, p. 89) judges: „Marx projects a number of his own weaknesses onto Stirner […]: moralism, illusionism, a tendency towards (verbal) sleight of hand, bragging, egoism. Eßbach (1982, p. 87) diagnoses Marx and Engels with deep „unease“ and a defence against fears arising from Stirner’s questioning of internalised norms: they projected these fears „onto Stirner with charged sadistic imagination“.